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Absence Without Leav:e - The Nature Of The O:flense 
< :By: :Captain Fredric I. Lederer, Instructor, Criminal Law Divisim, ,T J AGSA 
Of. all the varied punitive articles within the 
UCMJ, Article 86, AWOL, seems · .to be the 
mainstay · of the military lawyer's practice. 
Curiously enough this appears to have also 
been true in other eras 1 and nations 2• as well. 
Indeed, AWOL as an offense dates . back at 
least to the Articles of War of Richard II pro-
I . - ' 
mulga ted in 1385.3 ·Despite this long hallowed 
tradition, counsel frequently · consider AWOL 
prosecutions uninteresting and prof~ssionally 
unrewarding .. While thi~l · m~y be eas'iiy under-
standable (AWOL does lackthe "glamor" and 
challenge presented by other' equally tradi-
tional offenses such ~s . pillag~, 'looting~ and 
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rapine) it may unfortunately result in counsel 
taking the offense for granted. The numerous 
appellate decisions defining the offense of 
AWOL--;..(Article 86(3))-in simplistic/ but 
highly misleading terms, compounded · the 
problem. Consequently, an analysis of the of-
fense with particular attention to the Court of 
Military Appeals' latest pronouncement in this 
area in United States v. Lynch 4 appears 
merited. 
Absent without'leave h~s been ·said to be 
committed on the day of th~ inception ·of the 
absence.11 All time subsequent to the initial ab-
• .·. I . . 
sence is said to constitute pnly aggravation, 
important only for considerations of maxi-
. . I .. 
mum sentence.8 Numerous authorities, thus 
have recited the statement that "AWOL is not 
a continuing offense!' This 1 has led to the oc-
casional use of the term '~instantaneous" to 
describe the nature of the offense. If AWOL is 
viewed in this fashion-as complete u-pOn the 
soldier's unauthorized depar.ture from his · unit 
. :· . . . . "\ . ' 
--certain logical consequen<:es would seem to 
follow. First, consider thi~ hypotheti~al. If 
the accused is ·charged with AWOL from his 
. ' ' . i ' . . 
unit from on or about 1 January 1974 until 
on or about 30 .June 1974, it is logical to pre-
sume that the offense charged is AWOL on or 
about 1 January 1974. Thus if AWOL is ''in-
stantaneous" and ·.the prosecution, due to fail-
ure of proof, can prove only the termination 
date; the accused should be acquitted since the 
termination date, .although part of the aggra-
vating period, is a different offense than the 
inception date. Second, if AWOL is complete 
upon· the actual inception, the statute of limi-
tations should run from the actual (as against 
the date the prosecution may choose to prove) 
inception date. Third, for ·former jeopardy 
purposes acquittal at trial of .an inception date 
should not bar retrial for a new inception date 
subsequent to the first date-although within 
that date's period of aggravation. 
r 
Unfortunately the Manual for Courts-
Martial and the .appellate courts have indi-
cated that only the second -conclusion dealing 
with the statute of limitations 8 is correct. In 
5 
other words, the "instantaneous" model for 
AWOL is . not consistent fact situations. We 
must, therefore, conti:ime the search for ·:a 
description of the nature of the AWOL offense. 
The rules of pleading for Article 86(3) are 
well known and need not be discussed at 
length. It suffices to point out' that some incep-
tion date must be pleaded; Matters of proof 
are somewhat more complicated. If the gov-
ernment is unable toprove :the pleaded incep-
tion date,, but can · prove either the pleaded 
termination date or any other date within the 
single pleaded period of the specification,9 the 
accused may be convicted (by exceptions and 
substitutions) of an AWOL with a new incep-
tion date. This is true not only where the 
usual failure of proof occurs but also for the 
extremely rare case in which the accused es-
tablishes a defense of rnental irresponsibility 
to the initial part of the ·charged AWOL 
period.10 While the prosecution may prove any 
date within the pleaded time period, it may 
not create a second offense from the same 
period. In other words, if' the · evidence shows 
that the accused returned to military control 
during -the charged period ' and again absented 
himself, the court may not find him guilty of 
the second absence either alone or in conj unc-
tion with the first. 11 
These rules further undermine the "in-
stantaneous" model of AWOL; Since an ac-
cused may be convicted of any inception date 
within the charged period-despite its ·even 
extreme length and despite defense objections 
claiming fatal variance from the pleaded in-
ception date-AWOL cannot be considered as 
an "instantaneous" offense. Rather it appears 
more correct to describe the offense as a 
course of conduct. While the offense is com-
plete upon the absence for purposes of proof, 
it is incorrect to say that the rest of the time 
period is important only for aggravation. At 
the same time AWOL is not what has been 
called a "renewed" 12 offense because every 
day of the alleged period cannot be a separate 
chargeable offense for statute of limitations 
and former jeopardy purposes. 
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. The.Manual for Courts-Martial states clear,. 
ly that the statute of limitations runs from 
the inception date of the absence · because 
AWOL is inot a "continuing" offense and is 
~·committed, respectively, on the date the per-
son absents himself." 13 This language raises 
the possibility that the · defense can affirma-
tively prove an earlier inception date to raise 
the defense of statute of limitations. If PVT 
Doe .is charged on 28 December 1973 . with 
AWOL from 1 January 1972 until 15 Decem-
ber 1973, the statute of limitations would .bar 
prosecution for an AWOL beginning prior to 
28 December 1971. It . would appear perfectly 
proper for . the defense to prove that the 
AWOL actually began on 1 December 1971-
it could then argue that prosecution for the 
entire period was barred by the statute ·of 
limitations. It is important to note that despite 
the Manual's language, this result is consist-
ent with a conception of AWOL as a course of 
conduct. The inception date is vital, for it de-
fines the .offense in its most . basic sense. How-
ever, .the offense includes the remainder. of the 
. period for proper definition, otherwise every 
individual day would constitute an offense and 
the prosecution . could select any date within 
the period. If that date ·were not barred by 
the statute, a successful prosecution would re-
sult despite the date of the actual ,inception, 
. For purposes of former jeopardy, AWOL is 
also treated as a course of ·conduct. In United 
States v. Hayes,14 the accused was charged 
with desertion from 1 May 1952 until ll June 
1953. At trial the defense showed that the ac-
cused had earlier been convicted 15 of AWOL 
from 1 May 1953 until .11 June 1953. Hayes 
was then convicted of. desertio:p from 1 May 
1952 until 30.Apri11953. On appeal, the Navy 
Board of Review held that it had been error 
for the trial court to simplr exempt the period 
covered by the AWOL offense. The Board 
stated that · "within th~ same period of un.-
autkorized absence any lesser period of un-
authorized absence is the same offense but of 
Jesser : gravity." 16 The court ·argued that this 
result fo1lowed necessarily from the fact that 
AWOL is not a continuing offense. The recent 
6 
Court of Military ·. Appeals decision~ United 
States v. Lynch,17 appears to follow Hayes.lri 
Lynch, ·the accused was initially charged with 
AWOL from Special ·Processing Company, 
Special Troops, Fort Leonard Wood, froni . on 
or about 7 November 1969, until on or about 7 
January 1971. At trial at Fort Sill, .the defense 
showed that the accused had been apprehend-
ed by civilian authorities on 7 November 1969, 
and ultimately returned to military authority, 
The military judge acquitted the accused.18 
Within the week, Lynch . was charged with 
AWOL from SpeCial Processing Detachment, 
Fort Sill, from on or about 27 November 1969, 
until on or about 7 ·January 1971. At the 
second trial, the military judge denied the de~ 
fense's motio'n to dismiss the charge and speci.: 
fication on grounds of former jeopardy be-
cause the "offense of unauthorized absence is 
not a 'continuing one'." 19 On appeal the Gov-
ernment claimed that former jeopardy did not 
apply because Lynch had been prosecuted for 
a · different offehs~ each time. Two' theotiE:is 
were . urged-firstly, that !. different units were 
involved each time,·and ~econdly, that AWOL 
is not . a continuing offense and that, therefore 
the acquittal was irrelevant to the second ' set 
ofcharges which, dealing with a new incep-
tion . date, dealt with a new, offense. . 
The Court of Review reversed the convic-
tion, .stating that the apparent variance be-
tween units was inconsequential because at 
the time of the second trial, Lynch, while at-
t~ched to Fort Sill, remained assigned to Fort 
Leonard Wood and his alleged absence could 
have been prosecuted for AWOL from either 
unit.20 Turning to the claim that different of-
fenses were involved because different incep-
tion dates were charged, the court stated that 
the first trial apparently involved an AWOL 
running . from 7 November until return of 
Lynch to military authorities on 24 November 
1969, and that the holding of United States v. 
Reeder 21 preventing the carving out of a sec-
ond AWOL from a single period was applica-
ble. Using Reeder · as ·. precedent and finding 
that the doctrine of AWOL as a completed of.; 
fense on the date of inception had the effect of 
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benefiting the accused via the statute of limi-
tations, the court held that acquittal of an 
AWOL period barred prosecution at "a sub-
sequent trial for a lesser period of unauthor-
ized absence contained within the dates of the 
period of which he was acquitted." 22 
Upon certification by The Judge Advocate 
General, the Court of Military Appeals affirm-
ed the decision of the Court of Review. 23 Its 
opinion was somewhat more expansive, how-
ever. It indicated that "the Government's in-
sistence that the court's decision is 'inconsist-. 
ent' with our iterated pronouncement that 
'absence without leave is not a continuing of-
fense,' ... impels a separate statement." 24 A 
continuous offense, said the court, had been 
defined as "a continuous unlawful act or series 
of acts set on foot (sic) by a single impulse 
and operated by an unintermittent force, how-
ever long a time it may occupy." 25 AWOL is 
not a continuing offense in the sense that the 
offense was complete upon unauthorized de-
parture from the unit. However, the length of 
the offense is essential, according to Judge 
Quinn's opinion, not only for determining the 
maximum legal punishment but also in that 
the single charged time period may not be 
fragmented into two or more periods for 
jeopardy purposes. Because one "cannot be 
prosecuted and punished for an act which is 
'part and parcel' of an offense for which he 
was previously convicted and punished,'' 26 the 
first acquittal barred retrial for any time 
period contained within the first set of 
charges.27 
Unfortunately, the Army Court of Military 
Review decision in United States v. Espi-
nosa 28 shows that Lynch has not settled this 
area of law. Espinosa concerned an accused 
charged with AWOL from 15 May 1971 until 
26 February 1973. At trial the defense proved 
that the accused had terminated the absence 
on 31 July 1971 and had then again absented 
himself. Apparently to save the longer period, 
the trial judge found Espinosa guilty by ex-
ceptions and substitutions of the second 
period beginning on 31 July, and acquitted 
7 
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.him of the 15 May 1971 to 31 July period. On 
appeal the Court of Review set· aside the find-
ings of guilty, holding that the judge could 
have convicted Espinosa only of the first 
period and that the second period constituted 
an "uncharged offense'' which could be the 
subject of a retrial. Retrial of the first period 
was barred by the acquittal. As written, the 
Court of Review's opinion is difficult to under-
stand. Despite its statement that the trial 
judge "was not obliged to make any findings 
as to the uncharged offense commencing on 31 
July,'' it would appear that current procedure 
would indeed require the trial judge to acquit 
an accused of the second period. While Lynch 
discussed the two absences within one specifi-
cation problem,29 it did so within the context 
of an outright acquittal for the entire period. 
Thus, while Lynch may not be dispositive of 
the issue generally, until a new form of pro-
cedure is devised that does not result in an ac-
quittal of the second absence during the first 
trial, it would appear that Lynch would bar 
retrial for the second absence. 
Lynch and Espinosa are illustrative. of the 
weaknesses of the simplistic "instantaneous" 
definitions of AWOL. AWOL is an "instan-
taneous" offense for some purposes and a 
"continuous" 30 one for others. Obviously, 
what is involved is a question of semantics. It 
would be best if, rather than analyzing AWOL 
issues by ·means of a single multi-purpose 
model of the offense's nature, counsel focused 
directly on the result the decided cases have 
reached on the pleading, proof, statute of limi-
tations and former jeopardy problems pre-
sented by AWOL cases. One improvement in 
the conceptual framework can be suggested, 
however. If AWOL is viewed as an offense 
which included duration as a basic part of the 
offense, all of the cases appear consistent. The 
inception date will indicate the beginning of 
the period-the critical date for statute of 
limitations purposes and the first date for 
which the accused may be convicted. The du-
ration will allow the government within the 
single charged period to prove (as if by elec-
tion) any "inception date," because while 
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each day is not a new offense,31 the govern-
ment may prove the accusedwas.in an AWOL 
status beginning on any date within the 
charged period. However, having done so, the 
accused at a second trial will have a plea of 
former jeopardy as to any period included in 
the period originally charged regardless of the 
final. outcome at the first trial. Thus to the ex-
tent that any catchphrase can be used to de-
scribe AWOL, it might be well to describe 
AWOL .as a "course of conduct." 32 Using a 
course of conduct as. a model, counsel will be 
better able to predict the legal consequences of 
any given set of AWOL facts while escaping 
the erroneous conclusions that follow from use 
of misleading labels. 
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